http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/site/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/64757/index.do 
Baldwin et al. v. The Queen[1] (November 5, 2013) involved a motion by the Crown to strike what it alleged were irrelevant allegations in a set of related Notices of Appeal all dealing with exemptions claimed pursuant to the
Indian Act. The two allegations at issue were:
[2] In particular, the Respondent seeks to have the following underlined clause struck from each of the Fresh Notices of Appeal on the basis that the clause is not relevant and may prejudice or delay the fair hearing of these appeals. This clause appears twice in each Fresh Notice of Appeal.
“In the present case, the only competitors for Native Leasing Services are employee leasing firms created by Band Councils and, in one case, another employee leasing firm located on reserve
that was treated as tax exempt by the CRA.”
[3] The Respondent also seeks to have the following underlined sentences struck from each of the Fresh Notices of Appeal on the basis that they are not relevant as these appeals are not about how Native Leasing Services should be treated for competitive or tax purposes.
“The employee leasing business of Native Leasing Services was focused on providing necessary administrative services to employees working for social service organizations in the First Nations community and who were not providing services in the commercial mainstream. Alternatively, in Southwind, the Federal Court of Appeal’s concern about this connecting factor was that an Indian taxpayer should enter into the commercial mainstream on the same terms as other Canadians with whom he competes. In the present case, the only competitors for Native Leasing Services are employee leasing firms created by Band Councils and, in one case, another employee leasing firm located on reserve
that was treated as tax exempt by the CRA. If the basis of this connecting factor is to establish a level playing field for businesses providing employee leasing services to off-reserve non-profit and charitable organizations, then this connecting factor should weigh in favour of NLS being located on reserve. Otherwise, Native Leasing Services would be placed at a singular disadvantage compared to its competitors.”
The court struck the first allegation:
[14] I am aware of the decision in the motion in
Tuccaro v R, 2013 TCC 300 where the Crown sought to have a paragraph struck in the Notice of Appeal because it pled facts related to the tax treatment of other taxpayers. Bocock J. found that it was premature to strike the paragraph. He allowed it to remain in the notice of appeal on the condition that the Appellant had to amend the notice of appeal to plead facts concerning the application of the connecting factors test to the third party.
[15] I respectfully disagree. It is my view that pleading the facts and circumstances of a third party will not assist the Appellants in convincing the trial judge that the income they received from NLS was situated on a reserve within the meaning of section 87 of the
Indian Act: Sinclair (supra). As a matter of principle, a taxpayer must prove that it meets the requirements of the legislation on its own merits: F
ord Motor Co of Canada v Minister of National Revenue, [1997] 3 FC 103 (FCA) at paragraph 48.
The court declined to strike the second allegation:
[17] It is the Respondent’s position that the above sentences should be struck because the alternative argument made by the Appellants actually requests that the Court vacate the assessments on grounds of fairness or equitable grounds. The Tax Court’s jurisdiction does not include the power to make declarations or to instruct the Minister to correct a situation not resulting from an assessment.
[18] It is my view that the underlined sentences are arguments which the Appellants intend to make based on their interpretation of the decision in
Southwind v R (1998), 98 DTC 6084 (FCA). Whether or not I agree with the Appellants’ interpretation of
Southwind is really not the question at this stage of the proceeding. It is my opinion that the Appellants’ argument based on their interpretation of a decision should not be struck from the pleadings.
[1] 2013 TCC 363.